Proposition pour une thèse

Université de Bourgogne-Franche Comté (BESANCON) et Région Bougogne-Franche Comté

Economic analysis of medical choice in shortage circumstances
Ph.D. advisors:
Mostapha Diss, Professor of Economics, University of Franche-Comté & CRESE (EA3190):
Marc Deschamps, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Franche-Comté & CRESE (EA3190):

Topic and goals
Unavailability of medicines, vaccines, equipment (e.g., beds, ventilators) and/or medical personnel is a chronic problem in most countries, including OECD countries. These situations can arise from structural failures or from specific events (e.g., mass-casualty incidents, epidemiological situations). This leads doctors to make decisions in a situation of scarcity and to prioritize patients. This thesis aims at helping, thanks to the tools of economic analysis, to anticipate and manage these situations of shortage.
The first objective of this thesis is to provide for medical structures the elements allowing it to define indicators, e.g., vigilance levels (green/yellow/red), in order to anticipate risks of shortage situations. The second purpose is to understand on what basis and how the order of priority between patients is collectively envisaged within hospitals. The third purpose is to build, through matching mechanisms, recommendations to doctors in shortage situations. Finally, the fourth purpose aims at experimenting these tools with medical students and doctors in order to verify their operational character and to measure their social and professional acceptability.
The purposes of this thesis rely on methods and models that differ significantly across various fields of economic research: game theory (see, for instance, Bernhard and Deschamps, 2017, 2020), social choice theory, (see, for instance, Diss and Doghmi, 2016; Diss and Mahajne, 2020; Skowron, 2015; Skowron et al., 2019), matching theory (see, for instance, Baccara et al., 2020; Damiano and Lam, 2005; Roth, 2002; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990) and experimental methods (see, for instance, Kagel and Roth, 2016).
Desired profile of the candidate
This thesis in economics requires a very strong knowledge in mathematics (especially in optimization) as well as a very strong interest in modeling.
Applications from students with a background in mathematics or operations research are welcome.
Admission applications
Admission applications must be submitted no later than June 30, 2021. Please contact the two Ph.D. advisors.
1 fellowship Duration: 36 months

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Bernhard, P. and Deschamps, M. [2017] « On dynamic games with randomly arriving players », Dynamic Games and Applications, vol. 7, n°3, pp. 360-385.
Bernhard, P. and Deschamps, M. [2020] « Dynamic equilibrium with randomly arriving players », Dynamic Games and Applications,
Damiano, E. and Lam, R. [2005] « Stability in dynamic matching markets », Game and Economic Behavior, vol. 52, pp. 34-53.
Diss, M. and Doghmi, A. [2016] « Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes», Public Choice, vol. 169, n°1, pp. 97-116.
Diss, M. and Mahajne, M. [2020] « Social acceptability of Condorcet committees », Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 105, pp. 14-27.
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Skowron, P., Faliszewski, P., Slinko, A., [2019] « Axiomatic characterization of committee scoring rules », Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 180, pp. 244-273.